Teamwork is part of health care. The existence of teams suggests that there are strong bene ts from such an arrangement. Recently, as part of a drive to improve health care, it has been suggested that teamwork should be promoted by the use of team-based rewards; an example of this is the recently issued NHS Plan in the UK. 1 But to what extent does the economics literature on teams provide evidence as to whether team-based nancial rewards will necessarily improve health care? 2 Before addressing this question we need to note two things about teams and team pay. First, teamwork is usually de ned by the technology of production, in that the only way of producing the output is to pull together the (unobservable) contributions of different individuals. For example, a surgical operation requires the input of surgeons, anaesthetists, nurses, porters, cleaning staff and others. Less obviously, teamwork may even be promoted when individual tasks are independent, in order to compare the output of different individuals. An example is the grouping of pharmaceutical sales staff, each of whom operates in a separate geographical area, into a single team for the purposes of pay. Second, team compensation is based on the group's output: each team member will receive some share of this and the share she or he receives may not necessarily be related to her or his own output. It is this feature that distinguishes group rewards from individual performance-related pay.
Some insights from the economics literature on team -based rewards
According to the economics literature, the issues of how to de ne and how to reward a team are related, in that the optimal incentive scheme depends on the type of team. When a team is de ned by complementary skills, individuals will tend to free-ride if total output is fully shared among team members. 3 This is because the lower effort of an individual decreases the collective output, but the private marginal cost of lower effort to that individual (the fall in the individual's share in total output) is less than the social marginal cost (the fall in total output borne by the whole team). The mechanism for inducing appropriate levels of effort is the compensation system. Team members should not receive the entire value of output (or, if output is not measured in monetary terms, the total reward) if output falls below some target level. The threat of not distributing all the output (or the total reward) serves as an incentive mechanism. This threat is credible if a third party, who is not involved in the production process, claims the residual. In health care a third party might be the owners of a hospital or a purchaser.
Teams may be usefully de ned and rewarded even in the absence of complementarities in production. 3 This is so for those cases in which individuals are subject to common uncertainty (for example, uctuations in demand) which in uences the outcome of their effort. In this case, it is optimal to link an individual's reward to the contributions of other individuals exposed to the same risk. This is done by comparing the output of individuals and basing rewards on the individual's performance relative to other members of the team. A similar principle is applied in yardstick competition (as embodied, more or less, between hospitals under the Diagnosis Related Group scheme in the USA).
Teams could also be created by designing a system of rewards that fosters cooperation, a system of rewards that links each individual's reward to those of other workers. 4 Hence, group rewards may be optimal even when teams are not de ned by the production function: common uncertainties or the need to promote some particular features of teamwork, like cooperation, may require rewarding individuals not only for their own contribution but also on the basis of group performance. However, the literature also shows that compensation schemes vary according to the nature of a team and so the de nition of a team has to come prior to the speci cation of the optimal system of incentives.
The definition of teams in health care
The de nition of teams in health care is not straightforward. One approach is to de ne a team around a patient. 1 On the face of it, this seems an appealing idea. But, in practice, it has signi cant limitations. Only in a few cases are there precise protocols and guidelines that describe the procedures to be taken such that a patient's care is well de ned. In most cases, patients with the same condition may be managed differently due to the uncertainty of the diagnosis and of the treatment. In different hospitals, patients with the same condition may receive different care. Therefore, de ning a team around a patient would be quite ad hoc.
An alternative is to start with existing teams. The types of teams seen in health care include those across professions, those across organisations and hierarchical teams within an organisation (where senior and junior members of staff work together). Some of these teams may be small, others large. The distinction between small and large teams depends on the degree of observability of each team member's contribution. 3 In small teams, nal output is signi cantly affected by each individual's contribution so that a decrease in effort by one team member will signi cantly decrease nal output and will be easily detected. Our analysis suggests that small teams, hierarchical teams and teams across professions seem to be more suitable, in Editorial that the positive aspects of teamwork (such as cooperation and mutual monitoring) outweigh the negative aspects (such as free-riding and professional jealousies). 2 Many of the teams that currently operate in health care have these characteristics, as in, for example, hospital wards and medical rms (a senior plus several junior physicians).
Is a case for teamwork necessarily a case for financial rewards?
The fact that team production operates well in certain circumstances in health care does not necessarily mean that the team should be the unit for nancial reward. First, there is the issue of the de nition of output. The ef cacy of nancial rewards is conditional on the identi cation of a good measure of performance. 3 A good measure needs to distinguish between output that is due to the effort of the individual and that which is due to uncertainty in the production process. This issue is widely recognised and has been addressed in several health systems. Indicators are set to measure performance against targets, often on the basis of the level of service already being achieved by the best organisations. In the UK it has been proposed that these be linked to nancial rewards for teams (in this case, the team is de ned at the level of the whole organisation).
However, there is a danger that if the rewards are too strongly linked this might lead to collusion between health care providers. Providers could agree with each other to work less to lower the targets and hence increase the likelihood of getting extra rewards. These collusive activities are likely to be easier to achieve in systems in which health care providers have no tradition of competition. They may be facilitated when the measurement of performance is delegated to bodies who do not have any direct control of, and therefore have no interest in the funds to be used for promoting better performance. This practice, while common in centralised systems, is in strong contrast with the classic economics literature on teams, which suggests that the body that controls funding and gives out rewards should have no part in measuring or de ning the output.
Second, teams may be motivated by factors other than nancial ones. Members of a team may have their own incentives which depend on the structure of the team and cannot be enforced simply by altering individuals' compensation. In this case, implicit incentives (such as organising the production process in a way that it is possible for team members to monitor each other, or motivating workers by giving them more job independence) may be more effective than explicit nancial rewards. [5] [6] [7] Furthermore, nancial rewards may con ict with implicit ones.
Third, the responses of individuals to being rewarded nancially needs to be considered. Financial rewards may reduce intrinsic motivation. Increasing rewards for group performance where previously workers were only rewarded according to individual performance may not necessarily lead to greater cooperation and may reduce all levels of effort. 4 In other words, introducing small nancial bene ts for team production where previously there were none does not necessarily lead to cooperation and the nancial cost of inducing cooperation may be quite substantial. Financial rewards may also attract workers with less intrinsic motivation.
Fourth, teams overlap, in that the same individual can be a member of several teams. Moreover, people can change teams over time. Financial rewards may be less desirable in such instances because tasks performed in one team may be more easily measured than others, so that individuals may devote more effort to the tasks that are better rewarded, or the measures of performance in different teams may be inversely correlated. Individuals may also seek to change to teams that are better performers, so disrupting existing patterns of production.
In conclusion, the design of the optimal incentive scheme to induce teamwork in health care requires, as a rst task, the clear identi cation of teams and of their points of strength. As a second task it is necessary to identify when nancial rewards will have a bene cial effect. This requires experimentation that ties team rewards to particular types of teams and gives these teams different levels of team rewards. More generally, the lessons from the economics literature are that team production may operate better in certain types of teams but it does not follow that such teams are the types that should be rewarded nancially. Financial rewards do not automatically improve performance in a team. Task assignment, the physical organisation of the production process and the creation of a good working environment may better motivate team members and increase performance.
